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largest datasets to-date, consisting of 1490 unique African ﬁrms (11,183 ﬁrm-year observations)
from 1996 to 2012 from 15 African countries. Our results suggest that improvements in time-
varying country-level factors, including location advantages (market size, human capital and efﬁ-
ciency opportunities), national governance quality, and stockmarket development are associated
with an increase in the volume ofM&A activity. Consistent with the resource-curse paradox, high
resource endowments are not associatedwith increased levels ofM&A. In support of themanage-
ment inefﬁciency, but contrary to the traditional ﬁrm size hypotheses, African targets are gener-
ally characterised by declining stock returns and accounting proﬁtability, but aremore likely to be
larger ﬁrms; suggesting the presence of information asymmetry concerns in their selection.
Notwithstanding, we ﬁnd evidence of heterogeneity across countries with inconsistent sup-
port for the established target prediction hypotheses. Overall, our analysis suggests that a
model which combines ﬁrm- and country-speciﬁc factors better explains the observed var-
iations in African M&A activity.
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Africa1. Introduction
Despite substantial research on foreign direct investment (FDI), in general and merger and acquisitions (M&As), in particular,
little can be said about factors that moderate these phenomena in unique institutional contexts, such as the African continent. In
acknowledgment, Shimizu et al. (2004) call for more theoretical development and empirical examination of determinants of
cross-border M&As across different institutional contexts. This paper seeks to contribute to the international business strategy
(IBS) literature by investigating the degree to which changes in merger and acquisition (M&A) activity across key African markets
are explained by ﬁrm- and country-speciﬁc factors. Noteworthy is the fact that prior research on the subject has either focused on
environmental or country-level moderators of FDI and M&A (e.g., Rossi and Volpin, 2004) or on ﬁrm-level factors affecting the
selection of merger targets (Powell and Yawson, 2007), but rarely on both. Arguably, FDI through M&A is more likely to occur
if both country- and ﬁrm-level conditions are satisﬁed and hence, there is a need for greater linkage of the two literatures. Draw-
ing from a transaction cost economics theoretical perspective (Coase, 1937; Dunning, 1980), we examine the extent to whichvernance Research Group, Department of Accountancy and Finance, University of Huddersﬁeld Business
us, Queensgate, Huddersﬁeld HD1 3DH, UK.
.ntim@hud.ac.uk (C.G. Ntim).
nc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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nance quality and stock market development (i.e., country-level factors) explain observable variations in the volume of M&As
across 15 African countries. Additionally, we explore the extent to which individual ﬁrm characteristics (i.e., ﬁrm-level factors)
impact on the likelihood that speciﬁc ﬁrms within these countries will be acquired. Prior studies exploring country- and ﬁrm-
level antecedents of M&A activity are generally rare (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Gorton et al., 2009), and particularly
acute in the case of Africa (e.g., Rossi and Volpin, 2004). We focus on Africa for a number of reasons. First, Africa has become
an important economy on the world stage, but has been largely ignored in contemporary business research.
Fig. 1 shows the growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) between 1996 and 2012 for Sub-Sahara Africa, Organisation of
Economic Development and Corporation (OECD) and the World. The average growth in GDP for Sub-Sahara Africa (4.57%) out-
strips the average growth of OECD member countries (2.08%) and the World (2.83%) over the period. Despite this high level of
growth, many African economies still lag behind the rest of the world in terms of development (McFerson, 2010).
M&A can, perhaps, bolster economic development in Africa by improving local business' capabilities, creating an international
presence for local companies, providing access to global markets, providing ﬁnancing for growth and generating the level of mar-
ket competition necessary to spur efﬁciency in local companies (Stoian and Filippaios, 2008; Ferraz and Hamaguchi, 2002). Stoian
and Filippaios (2008), for example, argue that foreign direct investment (FDI) through cross-border mergers can foster develop-
ment in local economies through three channels. These include; the improvement of capabilities of local labour through training
programmes and new management techniques, the building of backward and forward linkages with other domestic ﬁrms
(e.g., supply chain partners) and through co-operation with local research institutions and universities (Stoian and Filippaios,
2008). Ferraz and Hamaguchi (2002) contend that cross-border M&As can spur the improvement of regulatory frameworks
and macroeconomic management strategies (through the restructuring of public ﬁnances and the prevention of massive private
sector bankruptcies) and the modernisation of local corporate governance, as well as, production capabilities. Cross-border
M&As into developing economies (such as those in Africa) sometimes target underperforming sectors and undervalued assets,
which might otherwise be wiped out from the economy (Ferraz and Hamaguchi, 2002). Further, prior research suggests that
M&A plays a disciplinary role (Palepu, 1986; Powell and Yawson, 2007) by replacing inefﬁcient management. This lends it the ability
to encourage and safeguard investments in times of regulatory andmarket failures. Many cross-country studies onM&A in emerging
markets (e.g., Alvarez andMarin, 2010) typically ignore keymarkets across the African continent, while others (e.g., Rossi and Volpin,
2004) focus only onmajor African economies, such as South Africa. Thismeans little is known aboutM&A in countries, such as Ghana,
Nigeria and Kenya,which are gaining economic traction on theworld stage (McFerson, 2010). An understanding of the antecedents of
African M&A is likely to be useful in informing economic and development policies in this region.
Second, despite these potential beneﬁts of M&A for Africa, prior research has focused on exploring factors driving inward FDI,
in general, but not M&As in particular, into the region. One reason for this is, perhaps, the historically small number of M&As into
the region, which constrains reliable statistical analysis. Like most emerging markets, several African countries are characterised
by relatively low M&A volume (Gomes et al., 2012). Rossi and Volpin (2004) attribute the relatively low M&A volume across
the continent (between 1990 and 1999) to poor ﬁnancial reporting quality and low investor protection. Prior evidence
(e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade et al., 2001; Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Gorton
et al., 2009) suggests that takeovers are most likely to occur in periods of economic recovery, coinciding with rapid credit expan-
sion, burgeoning external capital markets and stock market booms. The evidence also suggests that takeover waves are frequently
driven by industrial and technological shocks with regulatory changes, such as deregulation, acting as a catalyst (e.g., Martynova
and Renneboog, 2008; Rhodes-Kropft and Viswanathan, 2004). Over the last two decades, several African countries have
witnessed substantial economic growth (see Fig. 1), credit expansion, technological advancement and industrial expansion and
thus greater M&A activity can be expected in this region (Moghaddam et al., 2014). Some evidence (e.g., Moghaddam et al.,
2014) also suggests that multinational corporations (MNC) from emerging markets have begun to improve their competitive po-
sitions in the world stage by expanding through M&A. This highlights the importance of M&A in this region and the need for fur-
ther research on the phenomenon.Fig. 1. Chart of economic growth: Africa versus the world from 1996 to 2012.
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characterised by poor national governance (as demonstrated by high levels of corruption, lack of democracy, low levels of trans-
parency, and the presence of conﬂict and instability) and low levels of economic development. This experience is, for the most
part, unique to the African continent. Prior research argues that this trend of poor national governance across the continent stiﬂes
economic growth through FDI by raising uncertainty and transaction costs – “the grabbing hand hypothesis” (Voyer and Beamish,
2004; Wei, 2000; Zhao et al., 2003). However, recent years have witnessed observable improvements in national governance,
democracy, transparency and public accountability in a number of African countries (McFerson, 2009, 2010). It is interesting to
therefore explore how the efforts to improve the quality of national governance across different African countries impacts on
M&A activity in the region.
Our study makes the following contributions to the extant IBS literature. First, we explore country-level factors, including the
Dunning (1980) location advantages (including market size, resource endowments, human capital and efﬁciency opportunities),
national governance quality and stock market development that impact on the volume of M&A activity across different African
countries. Second, we test the established M&A theory in a new context (i.e., out-of-sample analysis) by assessing the impact
of ﬁrm-level characteristics on the level of M&A activity across different African countries. Here, our objective is to deduce wheth-
er the selection of takeover targets in this context is systematic and whether bidders select takeover targets to accomplish speciﬁc
objectives in line with prior M&A theoretical predictions. We redevelop the traditional ﬁrm size hypothesis to take account of the
unique characteristics of our new sample. In this regard, we explain why takeover likelihood and ﬁrm size for African ﬁrms have a
relationship inconsistent with the prediction of the traditional ﬁrm size hypothesis. Prior takeover prediction studies (Palepu,
1986; Brar et al., 2009) employ ﬁrm-level characteristics as determinants of takeover likelihood. We extend this literature by
showing that traditional prediction models augmented with country-level factors better explain ﬁrm takeover likelihood.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst large scale (i.e., a sample of 1490 unique ﬁrms from 1996 to 2012 from 15
African countries, giving a total of 11,183 ﬁrm-year observations) study looking at the time-varying country- and ﬁrm-level de-
terminants of M&A across the African continent. Our key ﬁndings are as follows. First, our evidence suggests that improvements
in time-varying measures of location advantages (including market, human capital and efﬁciency opportunities), national
governance quality (as measured by World Bank governance indices), and stock market development (stock market capitalisation,
market volatility and number of traded stocks) are associated with increased M&A activity. Nonetheless, contrary to Dunning
(1980), but consistent with the resource-curse paradox, the volume of M&A declines with natural resource endowments. Second,
we ﬁnd that takeover likelihood for African ﬁrms declines with a ﬁrm's stock market performance and accounting proﬁtability,
suggesting that target management inefﬁciency (Palepu, 1986) appears to drive the selection of suitable targets by domestic
and international bidders. But contrary to the prior UK, US and EU evidence (Palepu, 1986, Powell and Yawson, 2007, Brar
et al., 2009), takeover likelihood for African ﬁrms generally increases with ﬁrm size. This suggests that information asymmetry
concerns, perhaps, shape the selection of potential targets by bidding ﬁrms. Our subsample results, however, show heterogeneity
in ﬁrm-level antecedents of takeover likelihood across African countries. For example, we ﬁnd that targets in Egypt and Morroco
are more likely to be well-performing ﬁrms. Third, we ﬁnd that our country-level factors can augment a traditional takeover pre-
diction model to better explain the incidence of takeovers and the selection of takeover targets across Africa. This suggests that
the likelihood that a ﬁrm will be acquired in a particular period is dependent not only on its individual characteristics but also
on country-level and environmental conditions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses country-level antecedents of African M&As. Section 3 dis-
cusses ﬁrm-level antecedents of African M&As. Section 4 outlines the research design, data and method. Section 5 discusses the
empirical results, whilst Section 6 presents the summary and conclusion.
2. Country-level antecedents of African M&As
Given the limited number of prior studies looking at antecedents of M&A – a particular mode of FDI – into developing coun-
tries, we draw from the general FDI literature to develop our theoretical postulations. Several studies in M&A prediction modelling
implicitly assume that ﬁrm characteristics are the main time-varying factors that moderate their acquisition likelihood (Palepu,
1986; Powell, 2001). At a broader level, it can, perhaps, be argued that only when the surrounding environmental conditions
are suitable, do individual ﬁrm characteristics moderate ﬁrm acquisition likelihood (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade
et al., 2001; Rhodes-Kropft and Viswanathan, 2004; Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Gorton
et al., 2009). The relevance of suitable environmental conditions is, perhaps, even more critical in the context of developing coun-
tries, where issues such as the availability of factors of production, good governance and ﬁnancial (stock market) development are
particularly pertinent. To explore the country-level antecedents of M&As in Africa, we build on the well-established Eclectic par-
adigm or Ownership-Location-Internalisation (OLI) framework (Dunning, 1980, 1998) and consistent with Guisinger (2001),
North (2005), Dunning (2009) and Stoian and Filippaios (2008), expand our model to incorporate institutional factors (such as
national governance quality and stock market characteristics) which, perhaps, also moderate a country's attractiveness to M&A.
We discuss these next.
2.1. Dunning's location advantages
The motivation for FDI has been subject to substantial research since the 1960s (Hymer, 1960a,b, 1968). While a signiﬁcant
amount of FDI activities tend to be in the form of M&A globally, this has not been the case in the African continent (OECD,
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veloped countries is through M&A as compare to 33% for their developing counterparts. FDI provides an opportunity for growth
for local ﬁrms, an alternative to diversifying within their home market or acquiring other local ﬁrms (Dunning, 1980, 1998).
Dunning (1980) contends that some factors of production are company-speciﬁc (e.g., technology, knowledge, patents, trademarks,
and brand names), while others (e.g., natural resources) are location-speciﬁc. The OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1980) stipulates that
the decision to expand internationally makes economic sense when a ﬁrm “owns” certain assets (company-speciﬁc factors of pro-
duction such as patents, knowledge and skill, and technology), which allows it to generate a competitive advantage over the
challenges and costs of operating in an unfamiliar environment. The paradigm refers to these as “ownership advantages”. In
the current research, we focus on understanding the factors that make some ﬁrms within certain countries suitable M&A targets
and hence, “ownership advantages”, which generally pertain to the bidder's characteristics and are considered as “mobile assets”
(Franco et al., 2010), are not central to our work. In our model, these are somewhat captured by the characteristics of targets se-
lected by bidders. “Location advantages” in OLI framework explain why certain regions attract particular types of ﬁrms. Consistent
with Dunning (1980, 1998), this “location advantages”, perhaps, derive from the assets supplied by foreign markets, including
new markets for products (market size), natural resources (resource endowments), low cost factors of production (efﬁciency-op-
portunities) and knowledge and skill (human capital). We discuss these issues and generate empirical predictions in the para-
graphs that follow.
Prior research suggests that FDI is primarily driven by a market-seeking motive (Markusen, 1984; Brainard, 1997; Markusen
and Venables, 1998, 2000). The goal of FDI per this motive is to exploit the host market by directly supplying it or its neighbours
with goods and services (Franco et al., 2010). In this context, FDI (through M&A) allows ﬁrms to improve their competitiveness
through a reduction in transportation costs or tariffs associated with exporting and by being more responsive to their customers
(Brainard, 1997; Markusen and Venables, 2000; Franco et al., 2010). GDP ﬁgures from the African Development Bank and World
Bank suggest that several African economies have witnessed tremendous market growth over the last decade. On average, year on
year, African economies grew by 5.27% between 2000 and 2010 compared to the 2.77% global growth (see Fig. 1). The evidence,
however, suggests signiﬁcant variability within-country over time, as well as, across countries. Consistent with prior studies
(Dunning, 1980; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Harford, 2005), our ﬁrst prediction is that market size (measured by GDP) ex-
plains variations in the volume of M&A across African markets. However, this might not be the case in the context of Africa as
several MNCs expanding into developing markets have been shown to adopt a regional approach, where regional headquarters
(RHQs) are sometimes used as vantage points for responding to customers across the entire region (Lasserre, 1996). As suggested
by Luiz and Radebe (2012), the choice of RHQs in Africa is linked to advantages of agglomeration, economies of scale and the
quality of the institutional environment. We consider the quality of the institutional environment at a later stage in this study.
Next, the OLI framework suggests that resource endowments (such as the presence of natural resources) might explain why
ﬁrms choose to invest in some foreign countries (Dunning, 1980). Here, ﬁrms seek to acquire resources (i.e., raw materials),
which are either unavailable or available at a higher cost in their home country through FDI. Inconsistent with Dunning
(1980), prior research suggests a negative association between natural resource availability and FDI into developing economies
(Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2010; Asiedu and Lien, 2011). Asiedu and Lien (2011), for example,
argue that such a counter-intuitive relation could persist as high natural resources lead to currency appreciation, making exports
less competitive and, hence, crowding out investments in non-natural resource sectors. While initial exploration of natural re-
sources require signiﬁcant capital outlay, ongoing operations are not capital intensive, leading to a decline in FDI after the initial
exploration phase (Asiedu and Lien, 2011). Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2010) show that natural resources boost resource-
related FDI, but crowds-out non-resource FDI to the extent that the net effect is a reduction in aggregate FDI into the country.
Sachs and Warner (1995) also contend that natural resources (such as oil) deter FDI as resource-dependent economies are
characterised by booms and busts, and because such economies are likely to be undiversiﬁed, this leads to signiﬁcant volatility
in exchange rates and added vulnerability to external shocks. This counter-intuitive position is consistent with the popular eco-
nomic paradox – the Resource Curse – which explains the underperformance of resource-abundant countries, particularly those
in Africa (Sachs and Warner, 1997). Further, even if resource endowments are important for FDI, they are likely to explain FDI
in particular industries, such as oil & gas exploration, which are typically pursued through Joint Ventures and Greenﬁeld invest-
ments as opposed to full-ﬂedged M&As (OECD, 2006; Dikova and van Witteloostuijn, 2007). Following the literature, but contrary
to the predictions of the OLI framework, our second prediction is that the incidence of M&As amongst African countries will de-
cline with natural resource availability. We use “Total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP” (compiled by the World
Bank Group) as a measure of each country's resource endowments.
Third, the OLI framework predicts that the presence of knowledge and skilled labour (human capital) can attract FDI into some
countries (Dunning, 1980). Pfeffermann and Madarassy (1992) note that technological advances have led to a shift in FDI towards
more knowledge- and skill-intensive industries, making economies with high education levels more attractive FDI destinations.
Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) argue that MNCs enhance their competitiveness by organising themselves functionally, shifting key ac-
tivities (such as R&D, IT, customer services, accounting, training, distribution and the production of components) to countries best
suited (in terms of skills and costs) for such activities. A number of studies have examined the relation between human capital
and FDI in different contexts, with inconclusive results. Early studies by Root and Ahmed (1979); Schneider and Frey (1985)
and Narula (1996) do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation between human capital in developing countries and inward FDI in the pre-
1990 period. A study by Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) covering the period up to 1994 ﬁnds human capital is one of the most impor-
tant determinants of inward FDI into Africa, Asia and Latin America. Consistent with Noorbakhsh et al. (2001), we predict that
M&A volume will increase with the level of human capital. We use “Total number of patent applications” (compiled by the
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capital including “Total number of trademark applications” and “Research and Development expenditure (as a percentage of
GDP)”.
Further, the OLI paradigm stipulates that opportunities to generate efﬁciencies (perhaps, through cost savings) may attract
MNCs to expand to certain regions (Dunning, 1980). Local ﬁrms can service foreign markets through exports but this becomes
unsustainable when transportation costs and tariff barriers are high (Coase, 1937). In situations where a foreign market is at-
tractive enough, ﬁrms can improve their competitive position by substituting exports with local production. Indeed, several
studies have empirically shown that efﬁciency opportunities such as low production costs attract FDI (Asiedu and Lien, 2011;
Pfeffermann and Madarassy, 1992). Consistent with Dunning (1980) and Coase (1937), we anticipate that opportunities for
low cost production in certain African countries can increase their attractiveness to FDI through M&A. Our fourth prediction
is that the volume of M&A will increase with efﬁciency opportunities. We use the “Pump price of diesel fuel in USD” and
“Average wage in USD” (compiled by the World Bank Group) as simple proxies for cost of production.
The ﬁnal element of the OLI paradigm “Internalisation” explains why ﬁrms might prefer to engage in production abroad as op-
posed to subcontracting (through licensing or exporting) with foreign partners. The element contends that ﬁrms produce abroad
due to “internalisation advantages”, which derives from the propensity to earn higher rents on ﬁrm assets and/or achieve lower
transaction costs by engaging in production abroad rather than subcontracting (through licensing or exporting) with third parties
abroad (Dunning, 1980). As noted above, the current study nonetheless only focuses on the “where” question as we seek to ex-
plore what location and institutional factors make certain African countries more attractive M&A hotspots than their counterparts.
2.2. National governance quality
The second country-level variable in our model explores the extent to which the quality of the institutional environment im-
pacts on the volume of M&A in Africa. The African Development Bank views governance as the manner by which government
power is exercised to attain social and economic development (Boas, 1998). Data from international organisations, such as the
World Bank Group and Transparency International, suggests that when compared to Western nations, African countries are gen-
erally characterised by poor governance. This is supported by the often relatively high levels of corruption, political instability, low
regulatory quality, lack of accountability and general ineffectiveness of government institutions across several African countries
(McFerson, 2009; Kaufmann et al., 2010). This lack of national good governance is not only a salient characteristic to resource-
rich countries – the so called ‘resource curse’ – but also shared by resource-poor African countries (McFerson, 2009). Recent re-
search, nonetheless, suggests that some countries within the continent have shown signiﬁcant improvements in terms of gover-
nance quality. Based on evidence from the results of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance and Data from the Freedom House
annual global surveys of political rights and civil liberties, McFerson (2010), for example, argues that as a continent, Africa has
made progress in terms of national governance improvements over time — with Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, South Africa and
Tunisia, often cited as examples of African countries that have recently experienced improvements in the quality of their national
governance.
In a cross-country study, Rossi and Volpin (2004) ﬁnd that countries with better accounting standards and stronger shareholder
protection have a higher volume of M&A. Their sample includes a limited number of African countries, such as Kenya, Nigeria, South
Africa and Zimbabwe. Other studies show that country-level factors, such as macroeconomic stability, level of corruption, natural re-
source endowments and level of ﬁnancial development also explain the cross-sectional differences in the volume of M&As
(e.g., Vencatachellum andWilson, 2013). Li et al. (2012) ﬁnd that Rule of Law (an indicator of the quality of national governance) af-
fects value creation in international strategic alliances into BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), bymoderating the foreign
partners' willingness to share valuable knowledge assets. Another study by Karhunen and Ledyaeva (2012) also explore how corrup-
tion impacts on FDI choices, noting the choice can be modelled as a trade-off between the beneﬁts of having a local partner and the
costs associatedwith the existence of high levels of corruption. In general, poor national governance generates added political risk and
acquirers will require equally high returns to justify their decision to invest in countries with relatively poor national governance cre-
dentials. National governance quality, therefore, should impact onM&Aactivity asmoreM&A, especially those involving cross-border
bidders, are likely to be pursued in times of political stability, non-violence, low corruption, effective governments and high quality
regulation (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Vencatachellum and Wilson, 2013). Consequently, our ﬁfth
prediction is that improvements in national governance quality across countries and over timewill lead to an increase in M&A activ-
ity. As in prior studies, we measure the quality of National Governance and a country's institutional environment using time-varying
measures of corruption, including Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the World Bank's Control of
Corruption index (CCI), as well as, measures of political and legal maturity, including the World Bank's Government Effectiveness
index (GEI), Regulatory Quality Index (RQI) and Rule of Law Index (ROLI).
2.3. Stock market development
A key contribution of our study is that we focus on M&As distinguishing our study from the studies that look at FDI ﬂows in
Africa. The level of stock market development is perhaps critical to M&As, but not to other channels of FDI as M&A involving listed
companies generally require active stock markets. Allen et al. (2012) document the poor state of the ﬁnancial sectors of countries
in sub-Saharan Africa, noting that development in this sector trails that of other developing nations. With the exception of South
Africa, the level of ﬁnancial development in the continent is, arguably, low. This is characterised by low access to debt and bond
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quacy (Hearn et al., 2010; Andrianaivo and Yartey, 2010; Wang et al., 2015). Recent years have seen the rapid development of
African Stock Exchanges the adoption of international accounting and auditing standards by several African countries (Ntim et
al., 2007; Ntim et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2012; Ntim, 2012). The successful completion of M&A deals requires the existence of func-
tioning stock markets, with reliable stock valuations and sufﬁcient ﬁrms for bidders to choose from (Ntim et al., 2015). These mar-
kets will also provide liquidity to investors, reduce the cost of information gathering through collective wisdom in the pricing of
assets and provide opportunities for the risk sharing and diversiﬁcation. In the context of M&A, the pricing of targets, acquisition
of toeholds, payment through stock and opportunity for investors to liquidate their investment, all need fully functioning capital
markets. Consequently, our sixth prediction is that improvements in stock market development will lead to an increase in M&A
activity.
3. Firm-level antecedents of African M&A
The ﬁrst part of our model explores country-level factors (including location advantages, governance quality and stock market
development) that moderate the volume of M&A across African countries. In this section, we explore individual ﬁrm-level factors
affecting the selection of particular ﬁrms as suitable targets. Arguably, FDI through M&A is more likely to occur if country and
ﬁrm-level conditions are met. Two main theories explaining the incidence of M&A amongst ﬁrms, the neoclassical and managerial
theory, have been propounded. The neoclassical (or shareholder) theory of mergers proposes that mergers are planned and exe-
cuted by managers aiming to create, increase or maximise shareholder wealth (Manne, 1965). Mueller (1969) contends that man-
agers seeking to maximise shareholder wealth will engage in mergers when it increases the ﬁrm's market power, enables the ﬁrm
to achieve managerial or technological economies of scale, or when acquiring managers hold superior information about the tar-
get which is unavailable to the target's stakeholders. A review of the literature (e.g., Trautwein, 1990) suggests that managers can
maximise the wealth of shareholders through M&A in four key ways summarised under the efﬁciency theory of mergers
(managers aim to create synergies through M&A), monopoly theory of mergers (managers aim to bolster market power), raider
theory of mergers (managers aim to acquire undervalued assets through M&A), and valuation theory of mergers (managers have
superior information about a target's value compared to the stock market). These theories can be used to develop predictions on
ﬁrm-level determinants of takeover likelihood amongst listed ﬁrms in the African context. Here, we build on a takeover model
speciﬁcation employed across several studies (e.g., Palepu, 1986; Powell, 1997; Powell and Yawson, 2007; Brar et al., 2009;
Cremers et al., 2009). Palepu (1986) uses proxies of six propositions to build his takeover likelihood model. These six postulations
include the inefﬁcient management, ﬁrm undervaluation, growth-resource mismatch, ﬁrm undervaluation, price-earnings and
industry disturbance. Other researchers, such as Ambrose and Megginson (1992); Powell (1997) and Brar et al. (2009) have
suggested other drivers of takeover likelihood including real property, free cash ﬂow and ﬁrm age. These postulations are
discussed and adopted in the paragraphs that follow.
Prior research (Palepu, 1986; Morck et al., 1989) suggests that poorly performing managers or ﬁrms are more likely to be
targeted in takeovers. Here, the objective of the bidder is to generate value by more efﬁciently managing the resources available
to incumbent target managers with the neoclassical goal of maximising the wealth of shareholders. Management inefﬁciency is
generally proxied by a ﬁrm's accounting and stock market performance measures, such as its abnormal stock return, return on
assets (sales or equity) and operating proﬁt margin (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2003). Prior studies ﬁnd evidence that targets experience
a decline in stock returns (Powell and Yawson, 2007) and proﬁtability (Cremers et al., 2009) prior to their acquisition.
Some takeovers are motivated by the desire to acquire underpriced ﬁrms (Palepu, 1986). In this case, the bidder perceives the
potential target as relatively undervalued by the market given the book value of its assets. A bidder with superior management
ability can beneﬁt from this market discrepancy by purchasing the assets (target) and unearthing its true value. This could be
through divestments and reorganisation. A European study by Brar et al. (2009) which revealed that takeover targets have signif-
icantly higher earnings to price ratios as well as dividend yields, provides some empirical support for this postulation.
Palepu (1986) contends that a mismatch between a ﬁrm's growth levels and its available ﬁnancial resources will lead to take-
overs as bidders see opportunity to create synergies by correcting such an imbalance. In essence, low-growth high-resource ﬁrms
as well as high-growth low-resource ﬁrms are most likely to receive takeover bids (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001). Low-growth
high-resource ﬁrms, for example, are those with signiﬁcant liquidity, strengthened by low debt levels, but lacking in suitable in-
vestment opportunities. Empirical support for the hypothesis is mixed. Whilst Palepu (1986) provides evidence to support this
prediction, other studies, such as Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) and Powell (2004) do not ﬁnd support for the hypothesis.
Firms with excess free cash ﬂow are likely to be attractive takeover targets as the presence of excess free cash ﬂow exacerbates
the agency problem (Jensen, 1986; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989). In the presence of excess free cash ﬂow, managers are likely to
indulge in unproﬁtable projects or expropriate shareholder funds by securing managerial perquisites. More importantly, the pres-
ence of excess free cash ﬂow within a target, potentially, reduces the bidders implicit cost of acquisition as these resources can be
used to directly offset the bidder's acquisition costs. Consistent with this view, prior studies such as Powell (1997); Espahbodi and
Espahbodi (2003) and Brar et al. (2009) show that UK, US and European targets (respectively) have signiﬁcantly higher levels of
free cash ﬂow when compared to their respective bidders.
Bidders are more likely to be attracted to ﬁrms with substantial tangible assets (property, plants and equipment) in their total
asset portfolio (Ambrose and Megginson, 1992). There are several reasons for this. First, the acquisition of tangible property, po-
tentially, reduces the bidders cost of borrowing as these assets can act as collateral security (Powell and Yawson, 2007). Second,
tangible property (as compared to intangibles) is easier to value. Hence, the presence of substantial tangible property reduces the
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bidder's line of business can easily be sold post-acquisition to further reduce the cost of acquisition. Intangibles such as brands,
networks, goodwill, do not confer such advantages. In support of the real property hypothesis, prior studies including Ambrose
and Megginson (1992); Powell (1997) and Espahbodi and Espahbodi (2003) ﬁnd that takeover probability increases with the pro-
portion of tangible assets in a ﬁrm's total asset portfolio.
Smaller ﬁrms are likely to face a higher takeover threat due to a lower cost of acquisition and the relative ease of post-merger
restructuring (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 1997; Brar et al., 2009). Per this hypothesis, larger are ﬁrms are more expensive to acquire,
more likely to resist acquisitions, more difﬁcult to integrate/absorb and the pool of potential bidders for larger ﬁrms is smaller.
This view, however, fails to take into account the dynamics associated with ﬁrm size. The problem of information asymmetry
and its effect on the market mechanism – the market for lemons – has been discussed in prior research (Akerlof, 1970). The mar-
ket for ﬁrms is, perhaps, not an exception to this problem which is likely to be more pervasive in the African context. Some re-
searchers (e.g., Pettit and Singer, 1985) argue that, due to a lack of economies of scale in information production and distribution,
smaller ﬁrms are inclined to produce and distribute less information about themselves, thus leading to a higher level of asymme-
try between them and their stakeholders. This problem of comparatively higher information asymmetry in smaller ﬁrms is further
exacerbated by the lack of signiﬁcant analyst following in smaller ﬁrms (Eleswarapu et al., 2004). This suggests that, if bidders are
cautious of purchasing ‘lemons’, they are likely to bid for low information asymmetry ﬁrms – those which produce and distribute
large volumes of information about themselves and are followed by several analysts. Further, affordability and transaction costs
are unlikely to be a major concern for foreign bidders of African targets given the substantial disparity in the market value of
listed companies in developed and developing economies. The implication is that bidders for African targets will be, perhaps,
more inclined to acquire larger than smaller targets on average.
Younger ﬁrms are more susceptible to acquisitions (Agarwal and Gort, 2002). Substantial research has been done in the ﬁrm
life cycle literature which focuses on understanding the different stages in the life cycle of a typical ﬁrm (including industry entry,
growth, decline and exit). This literature frequently attributes ﬁrm survival (age) to the ability of ﬁrms to learn actively or
passively over time (Hopenhayn, 1992; Pakes and Ericson, 1998; Bhattacharjee et al., 2009). In line with the learning perspective,
Bhattacharjee et al. (2009) contend that exit rates (due to the hazard of takeovers or bankruptcies) should decrease with age.
Agarwal and Gort (2002) advanced the literature on ﬁrm age and survival by proposing that two key factors (learning-by-
doing and ﬁrm endowments) deﬁne its probability of survival (and hence likelihood of industry exit). Agarwal and Gort
(2002) contend that, over time, a ﬁrm gains knowledge about itself and its industry, which allows it to achieve cost reductions,
product improvements, and develop new market techniques — learning-by-doing. In terms of endowments, Agarwal and Gort
(2002) argue that ﬁrm endowments (i.e., a ﬁrm's inherent or natural suitability for proﬁtability) are generally low when ﬁrms
are born, but increase over time as ﬁrms invest in research and development. Older ﬁrms are therefore more endowed and
more knowledgeable about themselves. The implication is that the probability of ﬁrm survival within an industry increases as
ﬁrms grow older, learn about themselves and improve their endowments.
The country- and ﬁrm-level antecedents of M&A discussed above together with their selected proxies are presented in the
Appendix (Table A1). The proxies adopted are in line with those used in prior studies (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2004; Powell and
Yawson, 2007; Brar et al., 2009 and Cremers et al., 2009). Our proxies for location advantages (market size, GDP; resource endow-
ments, resource rent; human capital, patent applications; efﬁciency opportunities, pump fuel price and average wage), national
governance (Worldwide Governance Indicators, Kaufmann et al., 2010) and stock market development have been widely used
in prior research (McFerson, 2010; Vencatachellum and Wilson, 2013). We discuss our model in the next section.
4. Data and method
Our ﬁrst model, examines the relation between time-varying country-level factors (including the quality of national gover-
nance, economic development and ﬁnancial development) and the level of M&A activities (M&A volume) in African economies.
To investigate the effect of our country-level time-variant factors on M&A activity, we collect data on M&A activities, involving
listed companies across 15 African stock markets (including Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mauritius,
Namibia, Morocco, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe). We exclude some markets from our analysis
(e.g., Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Libya and Sudan) as ﬁrm-level data for these markets is unavailable. Consistent with Rossi and
Volpin (2004), we measure M&A volume (Volume) as the ratio of M&A bids to the number of listed companies in each country
in each year. Our model speciﬁcation is of the following general form.Volumejt ¼ α þ β Locationjt
 
þ γ Governancejt
 
þ δ MarketDevjt
 
þ ε ð1ÞFor robustness, we use several alternative proxies available in public domain to measure location advantages (Location),
national governance quality (governance) and stock market development (MarketDev). As discussed in Section 2.1, we proxy
location advantages as follows: (1) market size; GDP, and GDP growth, (2) resource endowments; and resource rent as a propor-
tion of GDP (3) quality of human capital; and number of patent applications, and (4) efﬁciency opportunities; price of fuel and
average wage. As noted in Section 2.2, we proxy the level of National Governance (Governance) using time-varying measures
of corruption including Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the World Bank's Control of Corrup-
tion index (CCI), as well as, measures of political and legal maturity including the World Bank's Government Effectiveness
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development, we use stock market capitalisation deﬂated by GDP, stock market total value traded deﬂated by GDP, market vol-
atility and the number of listed companies in each year deﬂated by total number of listed companies in the sample. We discuss
these measures further and provide information about the source of this data in the appendix (Table A1).
In our second model, we adopt the standard takeover likelihood modelling methodology, which posits that the likelihood for a
ﬁrm to be selected as a merger or takeover target is based on observable ﬁrm characteristics (Powell, 2004). Given that our study
has a cross-country focus, we extend this model by suggesting that a ﬁrm's likelihood of being selected as a target is dependent
on its observable characteristics, as well as the prevailing macro-environmental conditions (such as national governance, econom-
ic performance and ﬁnancial development). Following prior studies (including Palepu, 1986; Powell, 2001; Cremers et al., 2009),
we adopt a logit framework for computing ﬁrm acquisition likelihood. In this framework, we assume that a ﬁrm's likelihood of
being the subject of a takeover bid in period t, is a function of its last observable characteristics (in period t − 1). The basic
model is shown below.Logit Pitð Þ ¼ Ln
Pit
1−Pit
 
¼ β  Zit−1 ð2ÞPit is the takeover likelihood of ﬁrm i at time t and Xit−1 is a vector of characteristics (ﬁrm and country-level moderators of
acquisition likelihood) for ﬁrm i at time t − 1. Pit can be computed as the inverse of the logit function – i.e., the logistic function –
as shown below.Pit ¼ Logit−1 β  Xit−1ð Þ ¼
1
1þ e−β:Zit−1 ð3ÞIn Eqs. (2) and (3), Z is a vector of ﬁrm-level and country-level characteristics given by the following.Zit−1 ¼ β0 þ β1X1it−1 þ β2X2it−1 þ…þ βkXkit−1 þ εit−1 ð4Þβ0 is the intercept term in the logit regression and βj ( j = 1,…, k) represents the coefﬁcients associated with the correspond-
ing independent variables Xj ( j = 1,…, k) for each ﬁrm or country. The dependent variable in our model takes the value of one if
a ﬁrm is the subject of a takeover in a period and a value of zero otherwise. An observation is deﬁned as a target in period t (and
takes a value of P = 1) if it receives a bid in the current year. Otherwise, the observation takes a value of zero.
In additional analysis, we explore different lags in our model given the low volume of M&A activity and the inactive nature of
the market for corporate control in the region. Given the perceived high information asymmetry between targets and bidders, we
also consider that the decision to acquire a ﬁrm in a particular year may be related to its characteristics over a number of years
(such as the last three years or the last ﬁve years). The modiﬁcation of the lags used in standard prediction models allows us to
explore the dynamics of takeover likelihood and changes in ﬁrm characteristics over time. We employ STATA v.13 in conducting
our analyses. This allows us to perform panel regressions, adjusting our regression coefﬁcients and standard errors for the effects
of ﬁrm, year and country level clustering in our data.
To test our second model, we ﬁrst obtain a comprehensive list of all listed African Companies, live and dead from the Thomson
DataStream database. Each ﬁrm is identiﬁed by a unique DataStream code. We focus on the sample of all ﬁrms listed in the period
1996 to 2012 as very few M&A activity involving African targets is recorded prior to this period. Our sample consists of 1490
unique ﬁrms with DataStream codes. Unlike prior studies which utilise a match-sampling procedure (e.g., Palepu, 1986; Powell,
2001; Brar et al., 2009), we use a panel data set wherein each ﬁrm in our sample contributes an observation in every year be-
tween 1996 and 2012 until it exits the market through a bankruptcy, delisting or takeover. Notice that ﬁrms enter and exit the
sample at different points over the sample period, and hence, over the 17-year period, the 1490 unique ﬁrms only contribute
11,183 ﬁrm-year observations. From the Thomson OneBanker database, we collect data on all announced takeover bids in
every year between 1996 and 2012 where the target is a listed ﬁrm in Africa. We match both datasets using DataStream
codes. Finally, we match our macro-level data (national governance quality, economic performance and ﬁnancial development)
to this dataset using a unique country-year identiﬁer which we generate. We discuss our empirical results in the next section.
5. Empirical results and discussion
5.1. Trends in African M&A
First, we explore the incidence of M&A activity across Africa. Table 1 (Panel A) shows the distribution of listed ﬁrms, ﬁrm-year
observations and M&A targets by country. There were over 1490 ﬁrms in Africa during the period 1996–2012 — a total of 11,183
ﬁrm-year observations. South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria and Morocco are the countries with the highest number of listed ﬁrms as well
as the highest level of M&A activity. Even though Nigeria has more listed ﬁrms than Morocco, it has fewer M&A bids during the
period. When organised by year as in Table 1 (Panel B), we ﬁnd that, although, the number of M&A bids have steadily increased
since 1996, the number of listed ﬁrms has increased at a faster pace leading to a slight decline in the proportion of listed ﬁrms
that receive taker bids. Some of the early years (1996, 1997 and 2000) saw levels of M&A activity above 5%. In line with trends
Table 1
Sample distribution and characteristics.
Panel A: distribution of sample by country.
Country Firms Obs Targets Country Firms Obs Targets
Botswana 17 120 0 Nigeria 106 653 17
Egypt 217 1570 40 South Africa 795 6225 324
Ghana 29 209 2 Tanzania 5 36 0
Ivory Coast 29 192 0 Tunisia 53 362 3
Kenya 54 387 3 Uganda 6 41 0
Mauritius 41 296 2 Zambia 15 113 0
Morocco 79 681 21 Zimbabwe 37 247 5
Namibia 7 51 2 Total 1490 11,183 419
Panel B: distribution of sample by year
Year Firms Targets Target% Year Firms Targets Target%
1996 181 12 6.63% 2005 899 18 2.00%
1997 221 12 5.43% 2006 968 22 2.27%
1998 507 20 3.94% 2007 991 28 2.83%
1999 561 26 4.63% 2008 972 33 3.40%
2000 560 31 5.54% 2009 954 46 4.82%
2001 513 18 3.51% 2010 919 34 3.70%
2002 474 19 4.01% 2011 900 39 4.33%
2003 475 19 4.00% 2012 583 29 4.97%
2004 505 13 2.57% Total 11,183 419 3.75%
Panel C: M&A in Africa by industry
Industry Firms Targets Industry Firms Targets
s s s s
Aerospace & defense 3 0 Mining 785 52
Automobiles & parts 170 5 Oil & gas prodn & svcs 213 6
Chemicals 285 8 Personal goods 261 10
Construction & materials 723 34 Pharmaceuticals & biotech 189 9
Electronics & equipment 328 13 Real estate trusts & svcs 877 30
Financial services 2212 78 Retail 660 21
Food & beverage producers 1013 31 Software & computer svcs 443 18
Forestry & paper 83 2 Support svcs 425 16
Utilities 67 0 Technology hardware & equipment 146 4
Health care 108 2 Telecommunications 194 8
Household goods & construction 109 6 Tobacco 35 0
Industrials 1013 38 Travel & leisure 499 16
Media 224 11 Others 118 1
Notes: Panels A, B, and C show the distribution of listed ﬁrms (ﬁrm-years) and M&A targets in the sample grouped by country, year and industry, respectively. In
Panel A, Firms refers to the number of ﬁrms listed on the country's main stock exchange, Obs refers to the number of ﬁrm-year observations for which data is
available and Targets refers to the number of takeover (M&A) bids associated to these ﬁrm-year observations. In Panel B, Target% refers to the proportion of
ﬁrms that receive takeover bids. In Panel C, Firms refer to the number of listed ﬁrms within each industry grouping per DataStream classiﬁcation.
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ﬁrms. There is no evidence of a signiﬁcant decline in M&A activity during the 2007–2012 Global Financial Crises and Recession.
Levels of M&A in 2012 are similar to those in 2000 with about 3.93% of listed African ﬁrms receiving takeover bids over the
2007–2012 period. This level of M&A activity is only slightly less than the 5.00% reported in developed economies such as the
UK (Danbolt et al., forthcoming).
As evident in Panel C, M&A activity in Africa cluster by industry. The most active M&A industries include ﬁnancial services
(including banking and insurance), mining, industrials (including transportation), construction and materials and food & beverage
producers. Other industries with moderate levels of activities include real estate investment trusts & services, retail (including
food & drugs), software & computer services, support services and travel & leisure. There is limited or no M&A activity in indus-
tries such as aerospace & defence, automobiles and parts, forestry & paper, utilities (electricity, gas & water), tobacco, technology
hardware & equipment and healthcare equipment & services.
5.2. Country-level moderators of M&A activities
Next, we empirically examine the relation between time-variant country-level variables and the volume of M&A activity as
speciﬁed by Eq. (1). The results are shown in Table 2. The dependent variable in all our regression models (models 1 to 15) is
M&A Volume deﬁned as the proportion of listed ﬁrms in each country which receive takeover bids in the respective year. The
independent variables in the model include proxies of location advantages, national governance quality and stock market
Table 2
Regression models for country-level determinants of M&A volume.
Panel A: M&A volume and location advantages
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
LnGDP 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000)
GDPGrowth −0.005
(0.738)
ResourceRent −0.001***
(0.002)
Patent 0.004***
(0.000)
FuelPrice −0.014**
(0.018)
AverageWage −0.014***
(0.004)
Constant −0.196*** 0.018*** −0.220*** −0.117** −0.210*** −0.252***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 174 160 174 158 158 152
R-squared 0.129 0.001 0.168 0.189 0.176 0.308
Panel B: M&A volume and national governance quality
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
LnGDP 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CPI 0.003***
(0.008)
GEI 0.006**
(0.028)
VAI 0.006*
(0.063)
RQI 0.002
(0.631)
ROLI 0.003
(0.427)
CCI 0.006*
(0.081)
Constant −0.216*** −0.197*** −0.208*** −0.203*** −0.206*** −0.204***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 168 157 157 157 157 157
R-squared 0.176 0.169 0.170 0.153 0.155 0.170
Panel C: M&A volume and stock market development
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
LnGDP 0.006*** 0.005* 0.005**
(0.004) (0.057) (0.019)
SMCap 0.000**
(0.028)
MktVol 0.001*
(0.085)
FirmConc 0.844***
(0.000)
Constant −0.138*** −0.118* −0.097**
(0.006) (0.074) (0.035)
Observations 160 160 174
R-squared 0.169 0.152 0.172
Notes: The dependent variable in the model is M&A volume deﬁned as the proportion of listed ﬁrms within each country that receive a takeover bid in any
particular year. Panel A shows the relation between M&A volume and location advantages (including, market size (LnGDP, GDPGrowth), human capital (patents),
natural resources endowments (ResourceRent), efﬁciency opportunities (FuelPrice, AverageWage)).Panel B shows the relation between M&A volume and measures
of national governance quality (including Transparency International's corruption perception index (CPI), the government effectiveness index (GEI), voice and ac-
countability index (VAI), the regulatory quality index (RQI), the rule of law index (ROLI) and the control of corruption index (CCI)). Panel C shows the relation
between M&A volume and measures of ﬁnancial development (including, stock market capitalisation (SMCap), Stock price volatility (MarketVol) and number
of stocks trading on the country's stock market as a proportion of total stocks traded in all African Stock Exchanges (FirmConc)). Variables are fully discussed
in Appendix A. P-values are shown in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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M&A volume following Dunning (1980). Generally, the results in Table 2 (Panel A) support our contention that M&A volume
across the 15 countries is moderated by location advantages. Consistent with Dunning (1980), M&A volume increases with
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ume of M&A by 0.9%. In untabulated ﬁndings, our results remain robust when we adjust Economic performance by the size of the
population (using GDP per Capita). The results also remain signiﬁcant when we adjust for clustering by country using the Rogers
(1993) methodology for computing clustered-robust standard errors. Consistent with Rossi and Volpin (2004), we do not ﬁnd ev-
idence that changes in the level of GDP growth from one year to another impacts on M&A volume. This suggests that while an
increase in a country's GDP over time might stimulate M&A activity, changes in the magnitude of the growth rate from one
year to another, in itself, does not have a direct impact on the volume of M&A activity. In our subsequent regressions, we consider
Ln GDP as a control variable to evaluate the effects of other location advantages, national governance and stock market develop-
ment on the volume of M&A activity.1
Inconsistent with eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1980) but in line with the resource-curse paradox and prior empirical research
(Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997; Asiedu and Lien, 2011), we ﬁnd a negative relation between M&A volume and resource endow-
ments. As accentuated by the resource curse paradox, we ﬁnd that an increase in resource endowment (proxied by resource rent)
by 1 unit decreases M&A volume by 0.1% (signiﬁcant at the 1% level). This suggests that, within our African sample, the presence
of natural resources does not directly improve the volume of M&A activity as suggested by the OLI framework (Dunning, 1980,
1998).
Consistent with Dunning (1980, 1998) and Noorbakhsh et al., 2001, the results suggests a positive relation between human
capital, knowledge and skill (as proxied by patent applications) and the volume of M&A. An increase in human capital by 1
unit increases the volume of M&A by 0.4% (signiﬁcant at the 1% level). Finally, the results show that measures of cost of produc-
tion (fuel price and average wages) are negatively related to the volume of M&A. An increase in average wage and fuel price by 1
unit decreases M&A volume by 1.4% (signiﬁcant at the 1 and 5% levels, respectively). This suggests that, consistent with (Dunning,
1980) the presence of opportunities to generate efﬁciency through low cost production, perhaps, partly explain variations in M&A
volume across African countries. In summary, these results show that, consistent with Dunning (1980), market size, human capital
and efﬁciency opportunities partly explain the incidence of African M&As. Contrary to Dunning (1980), however, we ﬁnd that re-
source endowments do not explain the choice of M&A destination in the context of Africa. Indeed, consistent with the resource
curse paradox and the studies that show a negative relation between resource endowments and FDI (Sachs and Warner, 1997;
Sachs and Warner, 1995; Asiedu and Lien, 2011; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2010), we also ﬁnd that resource endowments
have a negative impact on the volume of M&A activity across African countries.
In models 7 to 12 (Table 2, Panel B), we consider the relation between proxies of the quality of national governance in each year
across the 15 countries and the volume of M&A activities in each country in the respective period. The results show a positive relation
between the quality of national governance and the volume of M&A activity. The relation is statistically signiﬁcantwhen national gov-
ernance is proxied by CPI, GEI, VAI and CCI. For example, an increase in GEI by 1 unit is associatedwith a 0.6% increase in the volume of
M&A activity (signiﬁcant at the 5% level). These results suggest that, when we control for economic conditions across different coun-
tries and different years, improvements in the quality of national governance are associated with an increase in the volume of M&A.
That is, countries with more effective governance systems (particularly, in terms of low corruption, high government effectiveness
and high voice and accountability) are likely to see higher volumes of M&A.
In models 13 to 15 (Table 2, Panel C), we further evaluate the relation between measures of stock market development and
volume of M&A activity. The results reveal that, when we control for differences in market size between countries and across
time, the volume of M&A activity increases with stock market capitalisation, stock market volatility, the availability of traded
stocks. An increase in the concentration of traded stocks by 1 unit is associated to 84.4% increase in the volume of M&A activity.
That is, African countries with more developed stock markets in terms of the number of listed companies are likely to see higher
M&A volumes than their counterparts. Overall, in support of our prediction, the results suggest that the level of stock market
development positively impacts M&A activity.
The results in Table 2 suggest that the volume of M&A activity across our sample of African ﬁrms is moderated bymeasures of
location advantages, national governance quality and stock market development. Arguably, several of the 15 country-level var-
iables used in our analysis are interrelated. We therefore use principal component analysis to compress these 15 country-level
variables into theoreticallymeaningful components. This will act as a robustness check on the ﬁndings in Table 2.We restrict our
components to those with eigenvalues of at least 1. This allows us to generate 4 components (Comp1, Comp2, Comp3 and
Comp4) with eigenvalues of 6.687, 3.126, 1.413 and 1.130, respectively. These 4 components cumulatively explain 82.38% of
variation in our variables. Table 3 shows the loadings on each of the four components. For clarity we, exclude results where
the magnitude of loadings is less than 0.30. The overall Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is 0.80
which is above the recommended minimum of 0.50 for principal component analysis (Cerny and Kaiser, 1977).
Table 3 (Panel A) shows that measures of national governance quality load highly on the ﬁrst component (Comp1). The
second component (Comp2) has a mix of measures of stock market development, market size and human capital. Measures
of efﬁciency opportunities (FuelPrice and AverageWage) load highly on Comp3. Our proxy for natural resource endowments,
as well as GDP growth loads highly on Comp4. In Panel B (Table 3), we regress M&A volume (as the dependent variable) on
our 4 components (as independent variables). We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relation between M&A volume and Comp1
and 2, suggesting that national governance, stock market development and market size impact on takeovers takeovers. The
results also show a negative but statistically insigniﬁcant relation between M&A volume and Comp3, suggesting that1 In unreported results, we ﬁnd that our results do not materially change when we do not use Ln GDP as a control variable.
Table 3
Principal component analysis and regression results.
Panel A: principle component analysis diagnostics
Factor Proxy Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Unexplnd KMO
Location advantages LnGDP 0.487 0.179 0.687
GDPGrowth 0.839 0.187 0.407
ResourceRent 0.403 0.371 0.738
Patent 0.342 0.107 0.778
FuelPrice 0.673 0.275 0.340
AverageWage 0.610 0.269 0.545
National governance quality CPI 0.336 0.111 0.818
GEI 0.356 0.059 0.857
VAI 0.292 0.724
RQI 0.352 0.080 0.872
ROLI 0.312 0.070 0.864
CCI 0.340 0.071 0.810
Stock market development SMCap 0.315 0.081 0.825
MktVol 0.405 0.815
FirmConc 0.367 0.086 0.879
Overall Eigenvalue 6.687 3.126 1.413 1.130
Rho 0.446 0.208 0.094 0.075
KMO 0.080
Panel B: Regression results with components
Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Constant
Coef. 0.004*** 0.007*** −0.001 −0.001 0.015***
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.587) (0.352) (0.000)
Notes: The table shows results from principal component analysis (PCA) followed by regression analysis of identiﬁed components. We derive components in Panel
A. The proxies for location advantages, national governance quality and stock market development are fully explained in Appendix A. We restrict our components
to those with eigenvalues of at least 1. For clarity we only present results for magnitude of the loading when it is at least 0.3. Unexplnd refers to the proportion of
variability in each proxy unexplained by the four components. KMO is the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling adequacy. In Panel B, we regress the four
components on M&A volume. P-values are shown in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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ulate M&A, we ﬁnd a negative (though statistically insigniﬁcant) relation between M&A volume and component 4. We note
however that much of the variability (37.12%) of the variability in our proxy for resource endowment is not captured by com-
ponents 1 to 4. The adjusted R square of this regression model is 0.384.5.3. Firm-level moderators of acquisition likelihood
Next, we investigate the time-varying ﬁrm-level factors that moderate ﬁrm acquisition likelihood. We start by looking at
descriptive statistics for ﬁrm characteristics across our sample. In untabulated results,2 we ﬁnd that the mean return on asset
(ROA) for African ﬁrms over the sample period is 5.6%. Nonetheless, there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity amongst ﬁrms and
countries (standard deviation of 9.4%) with countries such as Botswana, Tanzania and Namibia achieving mean return on
assets of over 10%. The mean excess monthly return (AAR) as against the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI)
Emerging Markets Index is close to zero as expected. This suggests that on average ﬁrms in these African countries perform
in line with the all other emerging markets. The results show that book to market (BTM) values for African ﬁrms are above 1
on average, with Egypt, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe, particularly, experiencing depressed market values. Such depressed
market values could partly be explained by the political, economic and regulatory climate within these countries. We ﬁnd
signiﬁcant differences between countries in terms of average ﬁrm size (SIZE), but these results cannot be given too much
meaning due to the signiﬁcant differences in the number of listed companies. For example, as shown in Table 1, Tanzania,
Uganda and Namibia have less than 7 listed ﬁrms each while South Africa has over 795 ﬁrms. The average age (since incor-
poration) of ﬁrms in the panel sample is 7.8 years, with countries such as Botswana, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda having
several newly incorporated ﬁrms.
Table 4 presents results of univariate analysis (difference of means tests) comparing the ﬁnancial characteristics of targets to
non-targets. Panel A compares the ﬁrm (ﬁnancial) characteristics of targets to non-targets for all ﬁrms in the sample. Panels B, C,
D and E report the results obtained for South Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria, respectively.32 Available upon request.
3 We do not present results for other countries in our sample as we do not have sufﬁcient observations for robust independent statistical analysis.
Table 4
Difference of Means.
Targets NTargets Diff (T stat)
Panel A: full sample
ROA 0.053 0.056 −0.003 (−0.521)
AAR −0.007 −0.003 −0.004* (−1.857)
BTM 3.859 3.896 −0.037 (−1.300)
SGR 0.205 0.206 −0.001 (−0.053)
LIQ 0.130 0.123 0.006 (0.915)
LEV 0.285 0.272 0.013 (0.559)
FCF 0.007 0.015 −0.009 (−1.525)
TANG 0.290 0.290 0.000 (0.024)
SIZE 14.166 13.816 0.351*** (3.175)
AGE 9.912 7.722 2.190*** (5.557)
Panel B: South Africa
ROA 0.055 0.053 0.001 (0.237)
AAR −0.007 −0.005 −0.002 (−0.873)
BTM 3.38 3.274 0.106 (0.363)
SGR 0.2 0.196 0.004 (0.188)
LIQ 0.136 0.128 0.008 (0.963)
LEV 0.289 0.29 0 (−0.012)
FCF 0.008 0.011 −0.002 (−0.371)
TANG 0.295 0.281 0.014 (0.912)
SIZE 13.896 13.372 0.524*** (4.420)
AGE 10.863 9.738 1.126*** (2.408)
Panel C: Egypt
ROA 0.051 0.067 −0.016 (−1.663)
AAR −0.011 0.003 −0.014** (−2.067)
BTM 5.252 5.698 −0.446 (−0.396)
SGR 0.135 0.162 −0.027 (−0.464)
LIQ 0.129 0.154 −0.026 (−1.148)
LEV 0.264 0.217 0.047 (0.592)
FCF −0.001 0.033 −0.034* (−1.874)
TANG 0.281 0.302 −0.021 (−0.522)
SIZE 14.76 13.58 1.179*** (3.976)
AGE 8.986 7.757 1.229* (1.763)
Panel D: Morocco
ROA 0.048 0.062 −0.015 (−1.326)
AAR 0.008 0.001 0.007 (1.359)
BTM 4.578 3.841 0.737 (0.633)
SGR 0.166 0.129 0.036 (0.565)
LIQ 0.094 0.102 −0.008 (−0.241)
LEV 0.295 0.270 0.025 (0.254)
FCF 0.003 0.028 −0.024 (−0.970)
TANG 0.178 0.211 −0.033 (−0.640)
SIZE 15.442 14.636 0.806* (1.895)
AGE 8.914 8.202 0.712 (0.520)
Panel E: Nigeria
ROA 0.032 0.045 −0.014 (−0.548)
AAR −0.017 −0.006 −0.011 (−0.912)
BTM 11.911 5.759 6.152** (2.262)
SGR 0.213 0.297 −0.084 (−0.702)
LIQ 0.075 0.099 −0.024 (−0.969)
LEV 0.199 0.177 0.022 (0.301)
FCF −0.026 0.006 −0.032 (−0.803)
TANG 0.314 0.313 0.001 (0.019)
SIZE 17.539 16.569 0.970*** (3.280)
AGE 2.244 0.833 1.410*** (3.755)
Notes: Full variable deﬁnitions are given in the Table A2. ROA is the return on assets. AAR is the average monthly abnormal return computed using the market
model. BTM is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. SGR (sales growth) is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period.
LIQ (liquidity) is the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets. LEV (leverage) is the debt to equity ratio. FCF is the ratio of free cash ﬂow to
total assets. TANG (tangible property) is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. AGE is the number of
years since incorporation. NTargets refers to results for Non-targets. T statistics are shown in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
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returns), larger and older ﬁrms. On average, targets earn average monthly abnormal returns of−0.70% prior to receiving take-
over bids compared −0.30% earned by non-targets. The difference is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. We ﬁnd that, on average,
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tions of management inefﬁciency hypotheses as well as the empirical evidence from other markets (Powell and Yawson,
2007; Cremers et al., 2009; Brar et al., 2009). The average target has a size (Ln total assets) of 14.166 and age of 9.912 years com-
pared to 13.816 and 7.722 years for non-targets, respectively. The difference in size and age is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This
ﬁnding does not support prior evidence from other regions (e.g., UK, US, Europe) suggesting that targets are more likely to be
smaller and younger than non-targets (Powell, 1997; Powell and Yawson, 2007; Cremers et al., 2009; Brar et al., 2009;
Bhattacharjee et al., 2009). The ﬁnding suggests that the selection of African targets hinges on information asymmetry concerns
as larger and more established ﬁrms (even in major economies such as South Africa, Egypt and Morocco, as shown in Panels B, C
and D) are more likely to receive takeover bids. It also suggests that that affordability argument for the preference of smaller
over big ﬁrms as potential targets (Palepu, 1986) might not be relevant in the African context. The univariate results for the
other hypotheses do not reveal signiﬁcant differences in the ﬁrm characteristics of African targets and non-targets. The full sam-
ple results are largely consistent with the results from subsample analysis (Panel B: South Africa, Panel C: Egypt, Panel D:
Morocco, Panel E: Nigeria).
We further explore the results of the univariate analysis (Table 4) through logit regression analysis. Prior to running the
model, we assess the likelihood of multicollinearity between our variables by computing Pearson and Spearman correlation
coefﬁcients, as well as, variance inﬂation factors (VIF) and tolerance values. The results from our multicollinearity diagnostics
(untabulated) show a signiﬁcant correlation between the independent variables. Nonetheless, the Pearson and Spearman
correlation coefﬁcients are quite low and are therefore unlikely to lead to issues of multicollinearity. The VIFs for all our
variables are below the 3.0 threshold thus further eliminating any concerns of multicollinearity. These results are available
upon request. In our logit models (Table 5), the dependent variable is a binary measure of takeover likelihood (it takes a
value of 1 when a ﬁrm receives a takeover bid and zero, otherwise) and the independent variables the ﬁrm-level determinants
of M&A activity.
In Table 5 we compare the characteristics of targets in the 5 years [Model (1)], 3 years [Model (2)], and 1 year [Model (3)]
leading up to the bid to the characteristics of non-targets using a multivariate logit framework. In addition, we report resultsTable 5
Logistic regression results for ﬁrm-level determinants of takeover likelihood.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
5Year 3Year 1Year Marginal Effects Egypt Morocco Nigeria South Africa
ROA 0.983*** 0.795*** −0.277 −0.011 3.689 4.089 −11.575 0.731
(0.000) (0.001) (0.130) (0.152) (0.132) (0.514) (0.149) (0.221)
AAR −2.206*** −3.646*** −3.118** −0.129*** 2.367 10.164** −4.441 −2.428**
(0.008) (0.000) (0.010) (0.001) (0.361) (0.039) (0.264) (0.017)
BTM 0.002 −0.002 −0.011*** −0.000*** 0.006 0.236** −0.024 0.000
(0.699) (0.594) (0.000) (0.004) (0.840) (0.032) (0.673) (0.989)
SGR 0.160* 0.137*** 0.156** 0.006*** 0.077 −0.070 −0.309 0.023
(0.061) (0.008) (0.011) (0.000) (0.730) (0.943) (0.805) (0.829)
LIQ 0.347 0.547 0.503 0.021 −3.607** 5.056* −7.842 0.624
(0.490) (0.238) (0.218) (0.265) (0.018) (0.091) (0.288) (0.250)
LEV 0.005 0.015 −0.111* −0.005* 0.409 −2.835 −2.169* −0.071
(0.951) (0.827) (0.064) (0.077) (0.355) (0.164) (0.074) (0.636)
TANG −0.077 −0.071 0.005 0.000 −1.273 2.839 1.218 0.232
(0.757) (0.751) (0.980) (0.980) (0.104) (0.122) (0.588) (0.383)
FCF −0.717* −0.792* −0.756** −0.031*** −2.587 −3.221 2.480 −0.304
(0.050) (0.065) (0.011) (0.000) (0.118) (0.114) (0.485) (0.529)
SIZE 0.043 0.069* 0.085** 0.004 −0.004 −0.028 0.631 0.118***
(0.356) (0.092) (0.041) (0.108) (0.970) (0.908) (0.327) (0.002)
AGE 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.000 0.003 −0.088 −0.370** −0.015*
(0.594) (0.669) (0.561) (0.527) (0.953) (0.321) (0.018) (0.100)
Constant −2.290*** −3.095*** −4.346*** −1.009 −3.191 −11.396 −2.932***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.531) (0.313) (0.272) (0.000)
Obs 6306 6306 6306 6306 758 244 115 4471
Wald Chi2 332.16*** 1155.93*** 772.04*** 772.04*** 19.09** 17.36* 36.41*** 17.94*
Pseudo R2 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.044 0.174 0.255 0.010
The dependent variable (BID) in the model is takeover likelihood which takes a value of 1 when a ﬁrm faces a takeover bid and a value of 0, otherwise. (1) to
(4) use the full sample of ﬁrms while (5) to (8) focus on different subsamples. In (1) and (2), BID lags of 5 and 3 years, respectively, are imposed such that a
BID is matched to a target's characteristics in the previous year as well as the last 5 (for (1)) and 3 (for (2)) years, respectively. Marginal effects in (4) are derived
using the Delta method and refer to marginal effects for (3). Robust p-values in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at country level (15 clusters) in (1), (2) and
(3) and for clustering at ﬁrm level in (5), (6), (7) and (8). ROA is the return on assets. AAR is the average monthly abnormal return computed using the market
model. BTM is the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. SGR (sales growth) is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period. LIQ
(liquidity) is the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets. LEV (leverage) is the ﬁrm's debt to equity ratio. FCF is the ratio of free cash ﬂow (op-
erating cash ﬂow minus capital investments) to total assets. TANG (tangible property) is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. SIZE is the nat-
ural log of a ﬁrm's total assets. AGE is the number of years since incorporation. P-values are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
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[Model (5)], Morocco [Model (6)], Nigeria [Model (7)] and South Africa [Model (8)]. In essence, we use 5-, 3- and 1-year lags
in models (1) to (3) to model the dynamics of target characteristics in the ﬁve-year period leading up to the takeover bid. In
Models (5) to (8), we model takeover likelihood as a function of a ﬁrm's last observable characteristics (i.e., characteristics in
the previous period).The results in Table 5 are based on clustered (by country and ﬁrm) robust standard errors. The results do
not change qualitatively when we alternatively add country dummies, industry dummies or ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. For brevity, we
do not report alternative model speciﬁcations.
Targets appear to be ﬁrms that are proﬁtable prior to the bid but lose proﬁtability in the years leading up to the bid. We ﬁnd
that takeover likelihood increases with ﬁrm proﬁtability in the ﬁve-year period leading up to the merger bid but declines with
proﬁtability in the bid year. Takeover likelihood also declines with monthly abnormal stock returns. These results support the
management inefﬁciency hypothesis as it suggests that targets are, potentially, proﬁtable ﬁrms which are inefﬁciently managed
(i.e., experiencing decline in performance) in the period leading up to the merger bid. The results for Nigeria (insigniﬁcant)
and South Africa (signiﬁcant) provide some support to our ﬁnding that M&A plays a disciplinary role in African ﬁnancial markets.
Notwithstanding, we ﬁnd that takeover likelihood in Morocco (signiﬁcant) and Egypt (insigniﬁcant) increases with ﬁrm account-
ing and stock performance. The business environment in these North African countries (Middle East and North Africa or MENA
region) is, perhaps, signiﬁcantly different from the environment in Sub-Sahara Africa. Prior research on ﬁrms in the MENA region
suggests that these ﬁrms are characterised by concentrated family ownership and blockholding (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007;
Claessens et al., 2000). Nepotism and managerial entrenchment persists, as family members are typically selected to manage
these corporations over long periods of time (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Bloom and van Reenen, 2007; Claessens et al.,
2000). As evident in our ﬁndings, the implication of this ownership and management structure is that the market for corporate
control has a limited effect in this context. To a bidder, there are therefore no substantial beneﬁts in merging with poorly
performing ﬁrms as their managers cannot, generally, be easily replaced. This, perhaps, explains why well-performing ﬁrms
make comparatively more suitable targets as bidders may directly beneﬁt from the ﬁrm's continuing success without the need
to replace incumbent management.
Our full sample evidence does not support the undervaluation argument (Palepu, 1986) as we do not ﬁnd that takeover like-
lihood increases with potential ﬁrm undervaluation. One reason for this might be our earlier ﬁnding that African ﬁrms have very
high book to market (BTM) ratios on average. Nonetheless, our results for Morocco shows that, consistent with the undervalua-
tion hypothesis, potentially undervalued ﬁrms are more likely to receive takeover bids. Recall, that we ﬁnd no evidence that M&A
has a disciplinary role in this particular market. The role of M&A here is, perhaps, one of correcting market inefﬁciencies in ﬁrm
valuation as opposed to managerial inefﬁciencies in managing ﬁrm performance.
Takeover likelihood increases with growth in sales (suggesting that targets possess potential for future growth or those in
growth industry) but declines with ﬁrm leverage. The results fromModels (1), (2) and (3) taken together suggest that targets
reduce their levels of leverage in the years leading up to the merger bid. Targets also appear to increase their holdings of tan-
gible assets in the period leading up to the merger bid. Consistent with the tangible property argument (Ambrose andTable 6
Firm and country-level variables as predictors of takeover likelihood.
(1) Firm-level (2) Country-level (3) Combined
Coef (P-value) Coef (P-value) Coef (P-value)
ROA −0.277 (0.130) −0.752*** (0.003)
AAR −3.118** (0.010) −3.168*** (0.000)
BTM −0.011*** (0.000) −0.014*** (0.000)
SGR 0.156** (0.011) 0.157*** (0.000)
LIQ 0.503 (0.218) 0.301* (0.066)
LEV −0.111* (0.064) −0.396*** (0.000)
TANG 0.005 (0.980) 0.095 (0.365)
FCF −0.756** (0.011) −0.353 (0.278)
SIZE 0.085** (0.041) 0.149*** (0.000)
Age 0.007 (0.561) −0.011*** (0.000)
Comp1 0.092*** (0.009) 0.193*** (0.000)
Comp2 0.345*** (0.000) 0.214*** (0.000)
Comp3 −0.080 (0.291) −0.107*** (0.008)
Comp4 −0.065 (0.160) 0.023 (0.264)
Constant −4.346*** (0.000) −4.373*** (0.000) −6.243*** (0.000)
Obs 6306 7459 4244
Notes: ROA is the return on assets. AAR is the average monthly abnormal return computed using the market model. BTM is the ratio of book value of equity to
market value of equity. SGR (sales growth) is the rate of change in total revenues from the previous period. LIQ (liquidity) is the ratio of cash and short term in-
vestments to total assets. LEV (leverage) is the ﬁrm's debt to equity ratio. FCF is the ratio of free cash ﬂow (operating cash ﬂow minus capital investments) to total
assets. TANG (tangible property) is the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets. SIZE is the natural log of a ﬁrm's total assets. AGE is the number of
years since incorporation. P-values are presented in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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results are not signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Inconsistent with the free cash ﬂow argument (Jensen, 1986; Lehn and Poulsen,
1989; Powell, 1997), takeover probability declines with level of free cash ﬂow. These results, when taken together with our
ﬁnding on sales growth, suggests that takeover likelihood for African ﬁrms increases when ﬁrms have growth opportunities
but lack free cash ﬂow to exploit them. This suggests that takeovers in this region are motivated by the generation of synergies
through the injection of ﬁnancial resources.
Further, in support of the results from Table 4, our results from Table 5 show that takeover likelihood for African ﬁrms increases in
ﬁrm size i.e., larger ﬁrms are more likely to receive takeover bids. As noted earlier, these results do not mirror the ﬁndings from other
markets (UK, US, EU). In the African context, larger ﬁrms are more likely to be established entities with better corporate governance,
more transparency, less information asymmetry and more stock market liquidity than their small counterparts making them more
attractive as potential targets. Looking at the results from Models (1) to (3) together, there is some evidence, that a continuous in-
crease in a ﬁrm's size (at least over the ﬁve year period) increases its visibility to bidders and its suitability as a potential target.
The results of multivariate tests on ﬁrm age suggest that takeover probability generally increases with ﬁrm age across the sample.
However, the regression coefﬁcient of the ﬁrm age variable is not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Subsample analysis
shows a signiﬁcant negative relation in the case of Nigeria and South Africa where younger ﬁrms are more likely to receive takeover
bids.5.4. Country- and ﬁrm-level factors as moderators of ﬁrm acquisition likelihood
We noted earlier that several prior studies explore country- and ﬁrm-level determinants on FDI and M&As in isolation. We
argued this is, perhaps, a limited view as FDI through M&As will only be pursued under suitable country- and ﬁrm-level condi-
tions. We next explore the extent to which ﬁrm- and country-level factors together explain a ﬁrm's takeover likelihood. Our de-
sign is to explore whether a model which combines both country- and ﬁrm-level factors has an incremental predictive ability over
that which employees either. As shown in Table 6, we generate a ﬁrm-level takeover prediction model using only ﬁrm-level data,
a country-level prediction model using only country-level data and a combined model which uses a combination of ﬁrm- andTable 7
The explanatory power of ﬁrm-level, country-level and combined models.
Obs. Pseudo R2 AUC Std. err. Chi2 Diff. in AUC
Firm-level Country-Level
Firm-level 4244 0.017 0.564 0.021
Country-level 4244 0.140 0.596 0.018 1.410
(0.235)
Combined 4244 0.152 0.639 0.019 22.030*** 6.150**
(P-value) (0.000) (0.013)
Notes: This table compares the performance of ﬁrm-level, country-level and combined models. ‘Firm-level’ refers to model where ﬁrm characteristics are only pre-
dictors of takeover likelihood. ‘Country-level’ refers to model where country-level characteristics (national governance quality, economic performance and ﬁnancial
development) are the only predictors of acquisition likelihood. ‘Combined’ refers to a model combining both ﬁrm and country-level variables in determining ﬁrm
takeover likelihood. The pseudo R square is the McKelvey and Zavoina's (1975) R squared. AUC is area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
with its standard error given by Std. Err. The last two columns present results for difference in AUC between the three models. P-values for Chi2 statistic are pre-
sented in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Operating Curve (AUC) diagnostics (Table 7). AUC comparison is based on the non-parametric method discussed in DeLong et al.
(1988). A model whose ROC curve equal to the diagonal line in the graphic (AUC = 0.50) has a predictive ability similar to a ran-
dom guess. The bigger the differential between a model's ROC curve and the diagonal line (i.e., the larger its AUC), the higher is its
predictive ability. A perfect model has an AUC of 1.
We ﬁnd that, in this sample, our country-level determinants of M&A activity better explain ﬁrm takeover likelihood when
compared to traditional ﬁrm-level factors. As shown in Table 7, the McKelvey and Zavoina's pseudo R square (and AUC) of the
logit model that uses only country-level variables to assign ﬁrm takeover likelihood is 0.140 (0.596) and this is higher than the
pseudo R square and AUC (0.017 and 0.564, respectively) of a model that uses only ﬁrm-level variables. Note that low pseudo
R squares of this nature are typical in takeover likelihood modelling literature. For example, Powell and Yawson (2007) reports
pseudo r squares of 0.02 (or 2%) for their main binomial logit model. The pseudo R square of the country-level model is over
eight times that of the ﬁrm-level model. These results are qualitatively similar when other measures of pseudo R squares (includ-
ing Cragg and Uhler's, Cox and Snell, McFadden's and Efron's R Squares) are employed. The difference in AUC between the
two models is, nonetheless, not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level (P-value of 0.235). A model which combines both
ﬁrm-level and country-level factors as moderators of ﬁrm acquisition likelihood outperforms either models. The AUC
achieved by the combined model (0.639) is also signiﬁcantly higher than that achieved by either models. These results
suggest that our country-level factors have signiﬁcant implications for ﬁrm takeover likelihood. In fact, country-level factors
which we advance in this study appear to better explain the incidence of takeovers amongst African ﬁrms when
compared to traditional ﬁrm-level factors. Put differently, established merger prediction propositions (based on ﬁrm
characteristics) do not fully explain the incidence of takeovers amongst listed African ﬁrms. This raises fresh questions
about the value relevance of ﬁnancial information produced by these ﬁrms as well as our understanding of what drives
M&A in this context.
5.5. Additional analyses and sensitivity checks
Here, we conduct further robustness checks on some of our key results. First, in our analysis, we considered all bids irrespec-
tive of whether the bids were successful or eventually failed in resulting to a completed takeover. In untabulated results, we ﬁnd
that our conclusions do not materially change when we focus on the subset of completed or successful bids only (i.e., exclude
failed bids). The results we obtain from this additional analysis are consistent with those in Tables 4 to 7. These results are avail-
able upon request.
Second, we explore the factors driving bids for control — those where the bidder aims to acquire more than 50% of the voting
rights in the target. These acquisitions generally represent substantial investment in the target. In untabulated results, we ﬁnd that
this sub sample is characterised by two distinct features. First, although targets involved in such bids generally experience a de-
cline in monthly abnormal returns prior to takeovers (as hypothesised), the likelihood of receiving a control bid in our African
sample increases with ﬁrm accounting proﬁtability. This suggests bidders are keen to gain control of ﬁrms with a track record
and potential for proﬁtability. Second, unlike other bids, the likelihood of receiving a control bid increases with ﬁrm free cash
ﬂow. Given that control bids are signiﬁcant investments the presence of excess free cash ﬂow in the target potentially allows
the bidder to reduce some of the implicit acquisition costs. We did not restrict our sample to control bids in the main part of
our study as this signiﬁcantly reduces the number of bids in our sample.
For our third robustness check, we explore differences in the characteristics of targets of domestic and cross-border bids. We
deﬁne domestic bids as bids from other African ﬁrms and cross-border bids as bids from outside the continent. In untabulated
results, we ﬁnd that the results for domestic bids are consistent with those presented in Table 5. Also consistent with the results
in Table 5, the results for cross-border bids show that a decline in accounting proﬁtability (management inefﬁciency) and a large
ﬁrm size (information asymmetry concerns) are the main ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors explaining the selection of targets in the region by
cross-border bidders.
Finally, Manne (1965) contends that the takeover market makes the corporate world a more efﬁcient one by ensuring that
managers who deviate from the best interest of their shareholders are replaced by more efﬁcient management teams. A conten-
tious issue which particularly relates to this region is whether the market for corporate control or takeover market as an external
monitoring mechanism can enforce managerial discipline when the legal system is ineffective (Manne, 1965; Jensen and Ruback,
1983; Jensen, 1986). In untabulated results, we interact National governance variables with measures of management inefﬁciency
in our logit analysis. We ﬁnd some evidence that the market for corporate control works more efﬁciently (i.e., management
inefﬁciency is associated with takeover bids) in the presence of strong national governance (as measured by Rule of Law index
(ROLI) and Control of Corruption index (CCI)). That is, national governance and the market for corporate control are, perhaps,
complements not substitutes in addressing management inefﬁciencies.
6. Summary and Conclusion
6.1. Summary of Findings
This study has investigated the antecedents of FDI through M&A for listed ﬁrms in African markets. Generally, the results
support our contention that M&A volume across the 15 countries is moderated by location advantages prescribed in
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seeking motive of FDI: Markusen and Venables, 2000), human capital (the presence of knowledge and skilled labour:
Noorbakhsh et al., 2001) and efﬁciency opportunities (low production cost opportunities: Asiedu and Lien, 2011).
Inconsistent with eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1980), but in line with the resource-curse paradox and prior empirical re-
search on the subject (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997; Asiedu and Lien, 2011), we ﬁnd a negative relation between M&A vol-
ume and resource endowments. We ﬁnd evidence of a positive relation between a country's national governance quality and
the volume of M&A in attracts. Better institutional environments (lower corruption, more effective governments, appropriate
rule of law and government accountability) attract higher levels of FDI through M&A. Further, we ﬁnd that the presence of an
active stock market is a key ingredient in stimulating FDI through M&A. Countries with more developed stock markets
(i.e., stock markets with several listed ﬁrms which are actively being traded) do attract more M&A. Overall, these results
from country-level antecedents support our postulations that improvements in national governance, economic performance
and stock market development over time, potentially, lead to improvements in the volume of M&A activity and the likelihood
that ﬁrms will be acquired.
The results from ﬁrm-level antecedents suggest that M&A plays a key disciplinary role in many African ﬁnancial markets,
perhaps more efﬁcient than the role of regulation given the challenges of enforcement in these markets. We ﬁnd that the ex-
perience is heterogeneous across the continent with M&As in Morocco appearing to be more focused on correcting perceived
market efﬁciencies in the valuation of ﬁrms than the inefﬁciencies in the management of ﬁrms. Further, in full sample and
subsample (South Africa) analyses, we ﬁnd evidence that M&A targets are more likely to be larger listed ﬁrms. This evidence
is inconsistent with the traditional ﬁrm size hypothesis, but consistent with our argument that information asymmetry
concerns underlie bidders' selection of suitable takeover targets in key African markets.
Our study is based on the premise that M&A activity fosters regional and national economic development by channelling re-
sources to promising businesses, by correcting market inefﬁciency in the pricing of assets and through its ability to enforce man-
agerial discipline, amongst others. Our results suggest that regulators have a pivotal role to play in the development of the market
for corporate control as we ﬁnd a strong association between national governance, economic conditions, stock market develop-
ment and the volume of M&A activity, as well as, the likelihood that individual ﬁrms will receive takeover bids. Indeed, our ev-
idence suggests that in this region, country-level factors are stronger determinants of ﬁrm acquisition likelihood than ﬁrm speciﬁc
factors.
Our paper makes several unique contributions. The results show that time-varying country-level factors, such as the qual-
ity of national governance, economic performance and capital market development have a signiﬁcant impact onM&A activity
both in terms of the volume of activity and the likelihood that individual ﬁrms will be acquired. For the ﬁrst time, we present
large-sample cross-country evidence from Africa, which suggests that improvements in the quality of national governance,
economic performance and stock market development are likely to lead to improvements in M&A activity. As expected, we
also ﬁnd that the likelihood that individual ﬁrms will receive takeover bids can be explained by factors beyond their
characteristics i.e., country-level factors. Our results suggest that in this sample, these country-level factors better explain
the incidence of takeovers when compared to traditional ﬁrm-level variables.6.2. Limitations and areas for further research
This study focuses on M&A involving listed African companies. Arguably, a substantial number of ﬁrms in this region are un-
listed. In recent years, a signiﬁcant amount of FDI in Africa has hailed from China. The literature suggests that FDI decisions by
Chinese acquirers are unlikely to bemoderated by factors, such as location advantages and national governance quality explored
in this study. Nonetheless, we are unable to explore this argument as, over our sample period, all but six Chinese acquisitions
into Africa were for unlisted companies with limited data. Further, we have focused on key ﬁrm-level variables used in recent
M&A studies (Powell and Yawson, 2007; Danbolt et al., forthcoming) and, due to data unavailability, have ignored variables
linked to corporate governance (such as board size & board independence, CEO-chairman duality), which might also impact
on the likelihood for some ﬁrms to be involved in M&As.
This study opens up opportunities for future research in the area. Our results suggest that the M&A experience is heteroge-
neous across different African countries. For example, we ﬁnd that while poor stock market performance increases takeover
likelihood for ﬁrms in South Africa (as expected), the reverse is true for ﬁrms in Morocco. Future studies can further explore
the contextual factors that shape the market for corporate control across these different countries. There are opportunities to
expand the country-level determinants of African M&As by looking at variables related to inter-country trade. Clearly, sub-
stantial international trade (exports, imports) between two countries can foster business ties and facilitate M&As between
these countries. Further, Our results show that ﬁrm-level variables and established prediction hypothesis (Palepu, 1986;
Ambrose and Megginson, 1992; Powell and Yawson, 2007; Danbolt et al., forthcoming) do not really explain ﬁrm takeover
likelihood in the context of Africa. This raises new questions about the value-relevance of ﬁnancial information generated
by these ﬁrms, as well as the transferability of these established theories to a unique sample such as the African market. Future
research can explore the extent to which IFRS adoption by African countries facilitates or stimulates M&A activity and also how
other ﬁrm, industry and market characteristics impact on bidders' acquisition decisions in this context. Overall, this study ex-
tends the scant literature on M&As in African markets and contributes to our understanding of factors shaping the bidders'
choice of suitable takeover targets.
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Country-level determinants of takeover likelihood.
Determinants
Proxies
(Exp. sign)
Variable deﬁnition
Market size LnGDP (+) Natural log of GDP. Source; World Bank Group
GDPGrowth (+) Growth in GDP. Source; World Bank Group
Resource Endowments ResourceRent Total natural resources rents (as a percentage of GDP). Source; World Bank Group
Human Capital Patent Total number of patent applications made by residents. Source; World Bank Group
Efﬁciency opportunities FuelPrice Dollar price per litre of diesel. Source; World Bank Group
AverageWage Average wage in dollars. Source; World Bank Group
National governance quality CPI (+) Corruption Perception Index. Source; Transparency International
GEI (+) Government Effectiveness Index. Source; WGI
VAI (+) Voice and Accountability Index. Source; WGI
RQI (+) Regulatory Quality Index. Source; WGI
ROLI (+) Rule of Law Index. Source; WGI
CCI (+) Control of Corruption Index. Source; WGI
Stock market SMCap (+) Stock market capitalisation. Source; World Bank Group
development MktVol (+) Stock market volatility. Source; World Bank Group
ValueTraded (+) Stock market value traded as a proportion of market capitalisation. Source;
World Bank Group
TradedStocks (+) Number of stocks traded as a proportion of total listed ﬁrms in Africa
Notes: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2007, 2010) and freely available on the World Bank Group website
(Worldbank.org). The methodology for their development is discussed in Kaufmann et al. (2010). Data for country-level Economic and Financial development in-
dicators is compiled by the World Bank Group.Table A2
Firm-level determinants of takeover likelihood.
Determinants
Proxies
(Exp. sign)
Variable deﬁnition
Inefﬁcient ROA (−) Return on assets: Net income to total assets ratio
management AAR (−) Average excess stock returns over the last 12 months,
measured against the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI)
Emerging Markets Index
Undervaluation BTM (+) Ratio of total assets less intangibles to market value
Free cash ﬂow FCF (+) Ratio of operating cash ﬂow less capital expenditures to total assets
Growth-resource SGR (+/−) Sales growth: Percentage change in sales
Mismatch LIQ (+/−) Liquidity: Cash and equivalents to total assets ratio
LEV (+/−) Leverage: Long term debt to equity ratio
Tangible assets TANG (+) Tangibility: Property, plant and equipment to total assets
Firm size SIZE (+) Natural log of total assets
Firm age AGE (−) Number of days since incorporation/365
Notes: Firm-level variables used to develop proxies for the hypotheses are obtained from Thomson DataStream database. The proxies for these hypotheses, togeth-
er with their expected signs, are shown in the second column.References
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